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THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERN 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Stephen M. Feldman* 
For me the world has always been more of a puppet show. But when one 
looks behind the curtain and traces the strings upward he finds they ter­
minate in the hands of yet other puppets, themselves with their own 
strings which trace upward in tum, and so on. In my own life I saw these 
strings whose origins were endless enact the deaths of great men in vio­
lence and madness.1 
- Cormac McCarthy 
What is the politics of postmodern jurisprudence? Forms of 
postmodern interpretivism, including philosophical hermeneutics2 and 
deconstruction,3 assert that we are always and already interpreting. This 
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. B.A. 1977, Hamilton; J.D. 1982, Oregon; 
J.S.M. 1986, Stanford.-Ecl. I thank J.M. Balkin, Stanley Fish, Francis J. Mootz, Dennis 
Patterson, Adam Thurschwell, Mark Tushnet, Steve Winter, and Brent Hendricks for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1. CORMAC McCARTHY, ALL THE PR.mTY HORSES 231 (1992). 
2. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad Publishing Corp. 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960) [herein­
after GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]. The leading analyses of Gadamer's work are 
GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADmON AND REASON (1987) 
and JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF Truth and 
Method (1985). 
3. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967) [hereinafter DERRIDA, GRAM· 
MATOLOGY]; JACQUES DERRIDA, PosmoNs (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 
1981) (1972) [hereinafter DERRIDA, PosmoNs]; JACQUES DERRIDA, Cogito and the 
History of Madness, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 31 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi. 
Press 1978) (1967); JACQUES DERRIDA, Differance, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 1 
(Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Differance]; JAC­
QUES DERRIDA, The Ends of Man, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 109; JAC· 
QUES DERRIDA, From "Plato's Pharmacy," in DISSEMINATION, reprinted in A DER­
RIDA READER 112 (Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Plato]; JACQUES 
DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRIT­
ING AND DIFFERENCE, supra, at 278 [hereinafter DERRIDA, Structure]; Jacques Der­
rida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 
919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990) [hereinafter Derrida, Law]. For excellent discus­
sions of deconstruction, see JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION (1982); 
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA (1987); David Hoy, Jacques Derrida, in THE RE­
TURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 41 (Quentin Skinner ed., 1985). 
For an interesting comparison of Derrida and Gadamer, see G.B. MADISON, Beyond Se-
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assertion has provoked numerous scholarly attacks, many of which in­
voke standard modernist hobgoblins such as textual indeterminacy, sol­
ipsism, ethical relativism, and nihilism.4 From the modernist standpoint, 
postmodern jurisprudence thus is either conservative or apolitical be­
cause it lacks the firm foundations necessary for knowledge and cri­
tique. In this article, I argue that these modernist attacks not only are 
mistaken but that they also obscure the potentially radical political 
ramifications of postmodern interpretivism.5 
My discussion focuses on two recent and seemingly opposed arti­
cles: Dennis Patterson's The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: To­
ward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory6 and J.M. Balkin's Transcen-
riousness and Frivolity: A Gadamerian Response to Deconstruction, in THE HERME­
NEUTICS OF POSTMODERNITY 106 (1988) (favoring the Gadamerian viewpoint). 
4. For one recent attack on Derridean deconstruction as nihilistic and relativistic, 
see Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 714, 716, 724-25 (1994). 
5. For further essays in which I discuss postmodernism, including postmodern in­
terpretivism, see Stephen M. Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American 
Legal Thought: The Significance of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A 
RETROSPECTIVE (Bernard Schwartz ed., forthcoming 1996); Stephen M. Feldman, Di­
agnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial Practice (with an 
Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 1046 (1994) [hereinafter Feldman, Diagnosing Power]; Stephen M. Feldman, 
The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 16 IowA L. REv. 661 
(1991) [hereinafter Feldman, New Metaphysics]; Stephen M. Feldman, Exposing Sun­
stein's Naked Preferences, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1335 [hereinafter Feldman, Exposing]; Ste­
phen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in 
Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republi­
canism, 81 GEO. LJ. 2243 (1993) [hereinafter Feldman, The Persistence of Power]; 
Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 679 
[hereinafter Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn]. I also use a postmodern 
approach to analyze the relations between power and the constitutional doctrine of sepa­
ration of church and state in a forthcoming book: STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE 
DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARA­
TION OF CHURCH AND STATE (forthcoming 1996). 
I rely heavily on the. following books and essays that focus on postmodernism: 
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN. INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY (1992) [hereinafter 
BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS]; STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989); 
DAVID HARVEY. THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1989); FREDRIC JAMESON, 
POSTMODERNISM. OR. THE CULTURAL Lome OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991); JEAN­
FRAN<;OIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979); 
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM (1990); FEMI­
NISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990); Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, 
The Theory and Politics of Postmodernism: By Way of an Introduction, in 
POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY 1 (Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990); Stephen 
Crook, The End of Radical Social Theory? Notes on Radicalism, Modernism and 
Postmodernism, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY, supra, at 46. 
6. Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Recon­
struction of Legal Theory, 72 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1993). 
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dental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice.1 Patterson directly assails 
postmodern interpretivism, which he refers to as "interpretive univer­
salism "8 and "hermeneutic holism."9 According to Patterson, we must 
reject interpretivism because it necessarily leads to an infinite regress of 
interpretations: interpretivism sends us reeling into an abyss where we 
can never grasp the meaning of a text because it constantly slips away 
into another interpretation, another meaning - and another, and an­
other, and another. In contrast to Patterson, Balkin identifies himself as 
a deconstructionist - a type of postmodern interpretivist - and in fact, 
Balkin's article can be read as an effort to respond to Patterson's con­
cerns. Balkin acknowledges and directly confronts the potential nihilism 
of deconstruction, and in doing so searches for a source of human val­
ues. Specifically, Balkin attempts to identify the source of the human 
desire or drive for justice. He concludes that "transcendent values," in­
cluding justice, arise from "the wellsprings of the human soul," which 
transcend "the creations of culture." 10 
I shall argue that both Patterson and Balkin are wrong. Patterson 
mischaracterizes postmodern interpretivism. It does not lead to an infi­
nite regress of interpretations that undermines meaning, but rather, to 
the contrary, interpretivism explains how meaning and understanding 
are possible in the first place. We experience a meaningful being-in-the­
world because we are always and already interpreting. Meanwhile, 
Balkin errs by concluding that postmodern interpretivism, in the guise 
of deconstruction, needs to be augmented in order to explain the human 
desire for justice. Balkin underestimates the significant social and politi­
cal implications of deconstruction: deconstruction itself can explain how 
humans constantly quest after justice but never attain it. In short, the re­
ality of postmodern interpretivism - the way of our being-in-the-world 
- responds to both Patterson and Balkin. Interpretivism explains how 
we come to understand a text, and simultaneously, how we have an in­
exhaustible urge for justice. 
Part I of this article describes and critiques Patterson's argument 
against postmodern interpretivism and explores the relation between un­
derstanding and interpretation. 11 In his article, Patterson focuses on 
7. J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. 
REv. 1131 (1994). 
8. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 3. 
9. See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 
254, 314 (1992) [hereinafter Patterson, Postmodernism]. Patterson reiterates his criti­
cisms ofinterpretivism in his recently published book, DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND 
TRUTH 71-127 (1 996). 
10. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1139. 
1 1 .  See infra Part I. 
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Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish as "two exemplary proponents" 12 of 
interpretivism.13 I do not attempt to defend either Dworkin or Fish; in 
fact, Fish already has defended himself.14 Fish's defense, however, re­
volved around his persuasive demonstration that Patterson had misread 
Fish's corpus.15 Fish did not attempt to address the central questions 
raised by Patterson: how does one come to understand a legal text, and 
how are understanding and interpretation related?16 In critiquing Patter­
son's position, Part I explores the importance of philosophical herme­
neutics to the resolution of these questions. Part II focuses on 
postmodern interpretivism and justice by first examinmg the relation­
ship between philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction and then 
critiquing Balkin's argument connecting justice and transcendental 
deconstruction. Part II concludes by discussing how philosophical her­
meneutics helps us to understand the meaning of justice and how 
deconstruction feeds our inexhaustible urge for justice. 17 Parts I and II 
are tied together by their overlapping discussions of the political ramifi­
cations of postmodern jurisprudence. 
I. ON THE RELATION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND 
INTERPRETATION 
A. The Attack on Postmodern Interpretivism 
How does one come to understand a legal text - or any other text, 
for that matter? Because Patterson believes postmodern interpretivism 
12. Patterson, supra note 6, at 3. 
13. Patterson views Dworkin and Fish as being "united at the deepest level of 
philosophical conviction." Id. at 6; see also Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Con­
stitution, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 270, 279-93 (1993) (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITr, CON­
STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)) (attacking both Dworkin and Fish). See gen­
erally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT 
COMES NATURALLY (1989); Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation 
in the Law and in Literary Criticism, in THE PoLmcs OF INTERPRETATION 271 
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983). To me, however, Fish's criticisms of Dworkin can be sum­
marized in the statement that Dworkin is not interpretive enough. I tend to find Fish's 
position much stronger than Dworkin's. 
14. See Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis 
Patterson, 72 TExAs L. REv. 57 (1993). 
15. See id.; see also Steven L. Wmter, One Size Fits All, 72 TExAs L. REv. 1857, 
1861 (1994) (calling Patterson's misreading of Fish "monstrous"). I agree with Fish's 
assessment of Patterson's argument 
16. Fish notes that he and Patterson use the word "interpretation" differently. 
Nonetheless, Fish fails to pursue this important point by asking how we should use the 
word, or whether it matters how we use it See Fish, supra note 14, at 64. For Patter­
son's reply to Fish, see Dennis Patterson, You Made Me Do It: My Reply to Stanley 
Fish, 72 TExA.s L. REv. 67 (1993). 
17. See infra Part II. 
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errs in response to this vital question, he focuses his assault on this is­
sue. He launches his attack fairly enough by accurately presenting a ba­
sic tenet of postmodern interpretivism: "our fundamental mode of 
being-in-the-world is interpretive."18 His very next sentences, however, 
demonstrate that he misconstrues the deep ontological significance of 
this insight. He states: "To be is to be the bearer of an interpretive grid. 
One comes to have a world by virtue of one's possession of an interpre­
tive template laid against the external world, and the external world is 
then rendered intelligible." 19 Thus, Patterson mistakenly construes inter­
pretivism in modernist instead of postmodernist terms: he sharply sepa­
rates the individual interpreter from an external world. The interpreter 
seemingly possesses an interpretive template that she invokes to render 
the alienated external world understandable. Patterson's rendition of in­
terpretivism suggests a near-blind person {the interpreter) who gropes 
about in a house (the external world) until she fortunately finds a pair 
of glasses (the template). Suddenly, she can see - that is, understand 
the world. In Patterson's words, interpretivists argue that texts can be 
understood only "through some lens. "20 Indeed, Patterson suggests that 
interpretivists believe that one can readily exchange one kind or shade 
of glasses for another - say, green-tinted for rose-colored. 
Because Patterson construes interpretivism in modernist terms, his 
vision of the hermeneutic act is radically disjointed: interpretation is a 
process that mediates between understanding and text. Patterson writes: 
"[T]he act of interpretation is interposed between the utterance and our 
grasp of its meaning. Interpretation is an act of mediation: Done cor­
rectly, it results in the apprehension of meaning. Done poorly, compre­
hension eludes us. "21 Thus, when postmodern interpretivists claim that 
we are always and already interpreting, Patterson jumps up and ex­
claims, "Impossible!" To Patterson, postmodern interpretivism mistak­
enly sends the interpreter spinning into an infinite progression of inter-
18. Patterson, supra note 6, at 48. For example, Francis J. Mootz writes: "If a 
core theoretical premise of contemporary hermeneutics exists, it is the universality of 
the hermeneutical situation." Francis J. Mootz ill, The New Legal Hermeneutics, 47 
v AND. L. REv. 115, 126 (1994) (reviewing LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THE­
ORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992)). 
19. Patterson, supra note 6, at 48. 
20. Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEXAS L. REv. 
1837, 1846 (1994). 
21. Patterson, supra note 6, at 20. 
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pretations, an endless series of mediating acts. The interpreter thus 
never quite grasps the meaning of the text.22 
With textual indeterminacy gathering around our feet, Patterson 
predictably declares that the mud and muck of relativism and solipsism 
are about to gush forth into a life-threatening onslaught: 
Because interpretations or perspectives can and do differ, there may in 
principle be no way to choose between competing interpretations. The 
slide to relativism is swift and sure, for there is no stopping the infinite 
regress of interpretation. Every perspective begets another and so on and 
so on. In the end, it seems, all we have are our own perceptions.23 
Because of this impending solipsism and relativism, Patterson solemnly 
pronounces that postmodern interpretivism threatens to wash away the 
ground needed for social critique or critical theory: "Deconstruction, 
and other versions of 'hermeneutic holism,' give us no place to start [a 
critique]. Every place is as good as any other, so no particular set of 
terms can be taken as the appropriate place to begin. "24 Postmodern in­
terpretivism, in the end, generates political conservatism. 
What can save us from this interpretive slide to abysmal quietude? 
Patterson's answer, of course, is Wittgensteinian pragmatism.25 Patter­
son proclaims that "[t]he only way out of this vicious regress [of 
postmodern interpretivism] is to recognize that the normativity of rule­
guided behavior (e.g., law) lies not in the act of the individual (e.g., in­
terpretation) but in a practice. "26 The essential practice that saves us 
from the disaster of interpretivism is understanding. Understanding, in 
tum, is knowing how to participate in a practice: "[W]e have a world in 
concert with others because we understand the manifold activities that 
constitute that world. Catching on to and participating in these activities 
- knowing how to act - is the essence of understanding. "27 
Most important to Patterson, we must sharply distinguish under­
standing from interpretation. Understanding is "primordial, "28 while in-
22. Patterson writes: "If all understanding were interpretation, then each interpre­
tation would itself stand in need of interpretation, and so on, infinitely regressing to in­
finity." Id. at 21. 
23. Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted). 
24. Patterson, Postmodernism, supra note 9, at 314 (footnotes omitted). 
25. It is worth noting that some other commentators, contrary to Patterson, view 
Wittgenstein himself more as a postmodern interpretivist See, e.g., SAUL A. KruPKE, 
WITrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRlvATE LANGUAGE (1982); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781 (1989). 
26. Patterson, supra note 6, at 21. 
27. Id. at 55. 
28. Id. 
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terpretation is secondary.29 Understanding stands as "unreflective lin­
guistic practice, "30 whereas interpretation involves one's deliberate 
reflection about the meaning of a text. Interpretation, therefore, emerges 
as a "second-order, reflective enterprise "31 that we engage in only if we 
fail to understand a text immediately because its meaning is ambiguous 
or otherwise unclear.32 Patterson argues: 
The criterion for understanding an utterance is not engagement of a pro­
cess; rather, it is acting appropriately in response to the utterance. For ex­
ample, one evinces understanding of the request "Please pass the salt" 
by passing the salt or by explaining why it is impossible to do so. Under­
standing is made manifest in the act of passing the salt, and the act is a 
criterion for having understood the utterance. Understanding is acting 
properly in response to the request. If the request is vague or otherwise 
opaque, interpretation of the request may be necessary,. otherwise not. 
[Thus] interpretation is best thought of as an activity we engage in 
when our understanding of an utterance is somehow in question (e.g., a 
request to pass the salt when the salt is directly in front of the person 
making the request). Interpretation is an activity of clarification - we 
take the utterance in question and appraise competing construals or inter­
pretations of it in an effort to clarify its meaning.33 
In short, the very act of interpretation depends upon the practice of 
understanding "already being in place. "34 Understanding halts the infi­
nite regress of interpretation by allowing us to grasp the meaning of a 
text instead of spinning wildly from one interpretation to another ad in­
finitum. Understanding appears as the talisman that saves us from tex­
tual indeterminacy, solipsism, relativism, and nihilism. Thus, Patterson 
concludes, postmodern interpretivists crucially fail to recognize that 
29. Other Wittgensteinian pragmatists have argued in favor of this same distinction 
between understanding and interpretation. See Richard Shusterman, Beneath Interpreta­
tion: Against Hermeneutic Holism, 73 MONIST 181 (1990); James Tully, Wittgenstein 
and Political Philosophy, 17 POL. 'THEORY 172 (1989). 
30. Patterson, supra note 6, at 54. 
31. Patterson, Postmodemism, supra note 9, at 312. 
32. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 54-55. Shusterman writes: 
[T]hough all understanding is selective, not all selective understanding is inter­
pretive. If understanding's selection is neither conscious nor deliberate but prer­
eflective and immediate, we have. no reason to regard that selection or the resul­
tant understanding as interpretation; since interpretation standardly implies some 
deliberate or at least conscious thinking, while understanding does not. 
Shusterman, supra note 29, at 190. 
33. Patterson, supra note 6, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted). 
34. Id. at 55. Shusterman observes that understanding gives a "meaning-giving 
ground" on which to base interpretation. Shusterman, supra note 29, at 195. 
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"[ w]ithout understanding, interpretation would simply bite on air. "35 
The central interpretivist claim, that we are al ways and already inter­
preting, must be wrong because understanding stands prior to and sepa­
rate from interpretation. 
Of course, Patterson's conclusion hardly seems surpri�ing since he 
ends exactly where he began -his conclusion merely reiterates his 
premises. Patterson's argument can be summarized as follo ws: first, in­
terpretivists declare that everything is interpretation; second, interpre­
tivists describe interpretation as a mediating act that stands apart from 
other activities; and third, interpretivism represents confused thinking. 
If, as Patterson suggests, some activities clearly are not interpretive -
because interpretation stands apart as a distinct mediating act -then 
interpretivists have constructed an analytically imprecise argument. Yet, 
Patterson fails to consider the possibility that his own mischaracteriza­
tion of interpretivism -rather than interpretivism itself -produces 
the apparent confusion within the interpretivist position. 
B. Philosophical Hermeneutics 
Patterson's modernist portrayal of interpretivism moots his entire 
argument. His attack on interpretivism may be some what interesting, 
but it has nothing to do with postmodern interpretivism. The philosoph­
ical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer illustrates this point.36 To 
read Gadamer as undermining understanding resembles reading Thomas 
Kuhn as undermining science: it is to ske w the fundamental message. 
Just as Kuhn explains ho w scientists approach and understand their en­
deavors,37 Gadamer explains ho w we approach and come to understand 
35. Patterson, Postmodemism, supra note 9, at 313. James Tully argues that inter­
pretation, unlike understanding, never arrives at a practical use - it never reaches the 
stage of application. See Tully, supra note 29, at 194-95. 
36. To some extent, my criticism of Patterson arises from his failure to discuss 
Gadamer. Yet, Patterson claims to attack interpretive universalism, not just Dworkin and 
Fish, upon whom Patterson focuses. Furthermore, my desire to focus on Gadamer is not 
so unusual as to be unfair or uncharitable to Patterson. To the contrary, more and more 
legal scholars have begun to rely explicitly upon Gadamer. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Un­
derstanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coher­
ence, 103 YALE LJ. 105 (1993) [hereinafter Balkin, Understanding]; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990); Feld­
man, New Metaphysics, supra note 5; David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Her­
meneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985); Francis 
J. Mootz, III, ls the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REv. 
249 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Schol-
arship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992). 
. 
37. See THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLlITIONS (2d 
ed. 1970). 
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a text (or text-analogue).38 Indeed, from one perspective, "philosophical 
hermeneutics is an attempt to identify the irreducible conditions of 
human understanding. "39 
Gadamer maintains that an interpreter or reader is al ways situated 
in a communal "tradition "40 that inculcates the individual with 
prejudices and interests. Those prejudices and interests necessarily 
guide and limit understanding and communication. 41 That is, communal 
tradition and individual prejudices and interests constrain what one can 
possibly understand or see in a text. As Gadamer says, the traditions of 
one's community help to shape the interpreter's "horizon:" "the range 
of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular 
vantage point. "42 Furthermore, tradition is not a thing of the past. 
38. A text-analogue is any meaningful thing, event, or action that can be under­
stood or read as if it were a text See CLIFFORD GEERTZ. Deep Play: Notes on the Ba­
linese Cockfight, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 412, 448-49 (1973); Paul 
Ricoeur, The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in INTERPRE­
TIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE - A READER 73, 81 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan 
eds., 1979). Gadamer himself has linked his philosophical hermeneutics to a Kuhnian 
approach to science. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, in PHILOSOPlDCAL APPRENTICESlDPS 177, 179 (Robert R. Sullivan 
trans., 1985). 
39. Gregory Leyh, Introduction to LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND PRACTICE xi, xii (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). 
40. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 282-84. In a similar 
vein, Stanley Fish talks of the "interpretive community." See STANLEY FISH, Is There 
a Text in This Class?, in Is THERE A Truer IN Tms Cl.Ass? 303, 303-04 (1980); 
Stanley Fish, Change, 86 S. ATLANTIC Q. 423, 423-24 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, 
Change]. 
41. The r,oncept of prejudices comes specifically from Gadamer, while the concept 
of interests is derived from Jiirgen Habermas. See, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer, The 
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem (David E. Linge trans.), reprinted in JOSEF 
BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 128, 133 (1980) [hereinafter Gadamer, 
The Universality]. Habermas, in his early theory, argued that knowledge is possible only 
because of human "interests." Habermas delineated only three "knowledge-constitutive 
interests" - an interest in prediction and control, an interest in understanding of mean­
ing, and an interest in emancipation. See JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND 
HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Beacon Press 1971) (1968). I am, there­
fore, using the concept of human interests in a much broader manner so that it resonates 
with Gadamer's concept of prejudices. See also Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the 
Uses of Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 1773, 1795 (1987) (contending that "already-in-place in­
terpretive constructs are a condition of consciousness"). 
42. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 302; see id. at 306. 
Steven Connor writes: 
In trying to understand our contemporary selves in the moment of the present, 
there are no safely-detached observation-posts, not in 'science', 'religion', or 
even in 'history'. We are in and of the moment that we are attempting to analyze, 
in and of the structures we employ to analyze it One might almost say that this 
terminal self-consciousness . . . is what characterizes our contemporary or 
'postmodern' moment 
October 1996] Postmodern Jurisprudence 175 
Rather it is something in which we constantly participate. We are his­
torical beings who live in tradition, just as we live in a community: 
"[W]e are al ways situated within traditions ... [ which are] al ways 
part of us."43 We cannot escape or completely set aside tradition, 
prejudices, and interests, yet at the same time, Gadamer maintains that 
"tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what once existed. It 
needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. "44 
Significantly, although communal traditions and the concomitant 
prejudices and interests constrain our possibilities for understanding and 
communication, they simultaneously enable or empo wer us to commu­
nicate and to understand. Whereas Patterson insists that understanding 
stands prior to interpretation, Gadamer reasons that understanding 
makes sense only within the hermeneutic or interpretive process. Our 
traditions, prejudices, and interests actually open us to meaning, under­
standing, and truth by generating and shaping our expectations for a 
text: "the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the lit­
eral sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole 
ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the 
world. "45 The hermeneutic act -including understanding, interpreta­
tion, and application -occurs only because we already have cultivated 
prejudices and interests by participating in communal traditions.46 With­
out our prejudices and interests, we would have no direction; the notion 
of understanding would be nonsensical. Gadamer states that "belonging 
to a tradition is a condition of hermeneutics, "47 or in other words, tradi­
tion "makes understanding possible. "48 
When we turn to a text, we anticipate or assume its completeness: 
we assume that it can communicate some "unity of meaning. "49 Inter­
pretation thus requires us to con front the text as we search for its mean­
ing. The quest for meaning begins with our "fore-understanding " of the 
CONNOR, supra note 5, at 5. 
43. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 282. 
44. Id. at 281. 
45. Gadamer, The Universality, supra note 41, at 133. 
46. A Wittgensteinian perspective echoes philosophical heaneneutics on this point. 
Gene Anne Smith writes: 
[L]anguage is a practice, a technique, that we learn. It depends upon a given 
community of understanding and established practices, to be sure. But this is re­
quired not in order to verify my judgments. It is required to give the context in 
which I can make meaningful judgments at all. 
Gene Anne Smith, Wittgenstein and the Sceptical Fallacy, in WITTGENSTEIN AND LE­
GAL THEORY 157, 179 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992) (footnote omitted). 
47. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 291. 
48. Id. at 329. 
49. See id. at 293-94. 
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text - a fore-understanding generated from our prejudices and inter­
ests.50 This fore-understanding, however, is constantly adjusted as we 
question the text, as we penetrate further and further into its meaning;51 
we are "ceaselessly fonning a new preunderstanding."52 Through an in­
teractive process consisting of understanding, questions, adjustments, 
further questions, and so forth, the ultimate meaning of the text dialecti­
cally "comes into being."53 In this sense, then, interpretation resembles 
a conversation or dialogue between the interpreter and the text. Hence, 
while one anticipates or fore-understands a particular meaning for a text 
at the outset of interpretation, the dialogical process of hermeneutics 
can lead one to arrive eventually at a different meaning. Regardless, 
throughout this hermeneutic process, the interpreter continues to assume 
that the text is intelligible, that it has a unity of meaning, although in 
some instances an interpreter might finally conclude otherwise. 
The metaphor of the hermeneutic circle elucidates the dialogical 
nature of interpretation. Gadamer first presents the hermeneutic circle in 
its simplest form: "It concerns the circular relation between the whole 
[of a text] and its parts: the anticipated meaning of a whole is under­
stood through the parts, but it is in light of the whole that the parts take 
on their illuminating function."54 Gadamer, however, elaborates the her­
meneutic circle by accounting for the interrelations between interpreter, 
text, and tradition. According to Gadamer: 
[The henneneutic circle] is not fonnal in nature. It is neither subjective 
nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the move­
ment of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of 
meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjec­
tivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. 
But this commonality is constantly being fanned in our relation to tradi­
tion. Tradition is not simply a pennanent precondition; rather, we pro­
duce it our5elves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution 
of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of 
understanding is not a "methodological" circle, but describes an element 
of the ontological structure of understanding.ss 
50. See id. at 332. 
51. See id. at 267. 
52. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Re­
flection, in PHn.osoPmCAL HERMENEUTICS 18, 38 (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 
1976). 
53. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 462; see id. at 101-69. 
54. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Problem of Historical Consciousness, in INTER­
PRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE - A READER, supra note 38, at 103, 146. 
55. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 293. Elsewhere, I have 
described the Gadamerian henneneutic circle as follows: 
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In this reconceptualized hermeneutic circle, the meaning of a text 
comes into being.56 
Most important, in contrast to Patterson's Wittgensteinian ap­
proach, Gadamer emphasizes the unity of the hermeneutic act. Whereas 
Patterson insists that understanding and interpretation must be distin­
guished sharply, Gadamer maintains that the hermeneutic event is "one 
unified process. "57 To Gadamer, understanding, interpretation, and ap­
plication are not distinct events, but rather they constitute the compo­
nents of a unified hermeneutic act.58 We understand (or fore-understand) 
a text only insofar as we open to its meaning because of our prejudices 
derived from communal traditions; we develop prejudices only as we si­
multaneously accept and reconstruct - or interpret - communal tradi­
tions; and we understand and interpret texts as well as traditions only 
insofar as we apply them to practical problems within our current hori­
zon. We cannot extract any one component of this hermeneutic process, 
such as understanding, and treat it as a primordial, uncontested, stable, 
or noncontingent starting point.59 
Interpretation has two sides: on the one side, tradition limits the vision of the in­
terpreter as he or she approaches the text, yet on the other side, tradition does not 
exist unless people constantly create and recreate it through the interpretive pro­
cess itself. The latter side emphasizes that tradition is created as an ever new 
meaning of the text comes into being: as we participate in tradition by interpret­
ing texts, we transform and reconstitute that tradition. The two sides of interpre­
tation are not separate and do not function independently, rather they are simulta­
neous and interrelated. They resonate together as meaning comes into being 
within the hermeneutic circle. 





56. See GADAMER. TRurH AND METHOD. supra note 2, at 462; see id. at 164-
57. Id. at 308. 
58. See id. at 307-08, 340-41; Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 5, at 683-
59. David Couzens Hoy writes: 
[H]ermeneutics maintains that understanding is always already interpretation, 
suggesting thereby that understanding is always conditioned by the context in 
which it occurs. Similarly, understanding is always already application in the 
sense that the understanding not only arises from a contextual background but 
also focuses specific features of the context, highlighting some and thereby 
reconfiguring the context in the very act of reaching an understanding of the spe­
cific statute. 
David Couzens Hoy, Intentions and the Law: Defending Hermeneutics, in LEGAL HER­
MENEUTICS: HISTORY. THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 173, 174; see Fred 
Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, 
THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 3, 13-15 (describing hermeneutics as a uni­
fied process). 
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Gadamer's notion of a unified hermeneutic act directly corresponds 
with his metaphysical stance. Contrary to Patterson's characterization of 
interpretivism, Gadamer explicitly rejects modernist metaphysics, which 
opposes an autonomous subject or interpreter against an objective text. 
Thus, a text is not an object in a foundationalist sense - no uninter­
preted source of meaning stands outside of or prior to interpretation.60 
Instead, no matter what we do, we are always and already interpreting. 
In Gadamer's terms, hermeneutics is ontological.61 Our very being-in­
the-world is interpretive, and hence, we can never escape interpretation 
and understanding. Moreover, each interpretive encounter is itself onto­
logical. For example, Gadamer argues that when one views a picture, 
one does not approach it as a subject to an object; rather, the picture is 
an "ontological event"62 in which "being appears, meaningfully and 
visibly. "63 The hermeneutic act, then, is an ontological event in which 
meaning "comes into being."64 This ontological hermeneutics leaves no 
room for a disjointed hermeneutic act that would radically separate un­
derstanding and interpretation. Understanding, interpretation, and appli­
cation must remain conceptually and sociologically united to maintain 
the ontological quality of hermeneutics. That is, understanding, interpre­
tation, and application all are necessary components of the ontological 
event in which meaning comes into being.65 
This vision of a unified hermeneutic act is of paramount impor­
tance in responding to Patterson's major criticisms of postmodern inter­
pretivism. Basically, Patterson articulates two related charges. First, he 
claims that understanding must be distinguished from interpretation: un­
derstanding is primary and prereflective, while interpretation is secon­
dary and reflective. Second, he claims that if understanding and inter­
pretation are not sharply differentiated - if understanding is construed 
as a type of interpretation - then we fall into an infinite regress of in-
60. As Fish claims: 
[T]here is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal meaning one means a 
meaning that is perspicuous no matter what the context and no matter what is in 
the speaker's or hearer's mind, a meaning that because it is prior to interpretation 
can serve as a constraint on interpretation. 
STANLEY FISH, Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in DOING WHAT 
COMES NATURALLY, supra note 13, at 4; see Stanley E. Fish, With the Compliments of 
the Author: Reflections on Austin and De"ida, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 693, 700 (1982). 
61. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 137, 159, 477-91. 
62. Id. at 140; see id. at 144. 
63. Id. at 144; see id. at 489. 
64. Id. at 462; see id. at 164-65. 
65. In discussing the aesthetic experience of art, Gadamer notes: "Understanding 
must be conceived as a part of the event in which meaning occurs, the event in which 
the meaning of all statements ... is formed and actualized. " Id. at 164-65. 
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terpretations that dooms us to solipsistic relativism. In response to the 
first charge, if the hermeneutic act is a unity, as Gadamer maintains, 
then understanding and interpretation cannot be sharply separated. 
Neither understanding nor interpretation stands prior to the other, but 
instead they resonate in a reciprocal, dialectical relationship. In a sense, 
then, understanding is merely a momentary pause in interpretation. Un­
derstanding is a moment when the interpreter senses, at least tempora­
rily, that she has arrived at the meaning of the text. Yet, simultaneously, 
the whole point or purpose of interpretation is to reach understanding; 
consequently, to talk of interpretation as independent of understanding 
is nonsensical. Understanding is always interpretive, but interpretation 
is nothing but the movement of understanding. 66 
What does it mean, though, to assert that understanding is always 
interpretive? To Gadamer, it means nothing more than that we always 
open to and reach understanding only because of and through our 
prejudices and interests, which are derived from our communal tradi­
tions. Even understanding that is prereflective necessarily arises only 
because of our traditions and prejudices. In other words, even when one 
does not deliberate consciously about the meaning of the text, but rather 
appears to grasp its meaning immediately, that immediate grasp is pos­
sible only because the individual is situated within a horizon constituted 
by traditions and prejudices. In Stanley Fish's words: "A meaning that 
seems to leap off the page, propelled by its own self-sufficiency, is a 
meaning that flows from interpretive assumptions so deeply embedded 
that they have become invisible. "67 
Furthermore, communal traditions neither are fixed, precisely 
bounded entities, nor are they passed on to individuals through some 
precise method or mechanical process. Balkin provocatively suggests 
that traditions are akin to "cultural software" insofar as they "become 
part of us and shape the way that we perceive the legal and social 
world. "68 Nonetheless, traditions differ from computer software pro-
66. In a related vein, Hayden White writes: 
Understanding is a process of rendering the unfamiliar ... familiar; of removing 
it from the domain of things felt to be "exotic" and unclassified into one or an­
other domain of experience encoded adequately enough to be felt to be humanly 
useful, nonthreatening, or simply known by association. This process of under­
standing can only be tropological in nature, for what is involved in the rendering 
of the unfamiliar into the familiar is a troping that is generally figurative. 
HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: EsSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 5 
(1978). 
67. STANLEY FISH, Still Wrong After All These Years, in DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY, supra note 13, at 356, 358. 
68. Balkin, Understanding, supra note 36, at 167; see id. at 142. 
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grams in t wo important ways: traditions cannot be reduced to a fixed 
quantum of data like computer soft ware programs, and traditions cannot 
be perfectly installed or copied into each of us. To the contrary, tradi­
tions themselves take hold of us only through an interpretive process; 
traditions address us and must be absorbed or learned -often tacitly or 
unconsciously.69 Moreover, traditions are not static; they are constantly 
evolving, communal, social arrangements and memories within which 
we participate and live.70 In short, even the most immediate and pre­
reflective cognitive processes arise exactly because one has interpre­
tively absorbed communal traditions (and this absorption is often itself 
prereflective). Consequently, understanding cannot possibly precede in­
terpretation; we can never bypass interpretation to directly access the 
meaning of a text. Indeed, the ontological quality of the hermeneutic act 
underscores that the concept of a textual meaning standing prior to in­
terpretation is nonsensical. As Gadamer writes: " Interpretation is not an 
occasional, post facto supplement to understanding; rather, understand­
ing is al ways interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form 
of understanding. In accordance with this insight, interpretive language 
and concepts [are] recognized as belonging to the inner structure of 
understanding. "71 
Thus, if understanding and interpretation are not sharply differenti­
ated, what of Patterson's second charge: that we are thro wn into an infi­
nite regress of interpretations that dooms us to solipsistic relativism? 
Once again, the notion of a unified hermeneutic act ans wers this criti­
cism. The unified hermeneutic act includes understanding, interpreta­
tion, and application. The element of application underscores that the 
hermeneutic act is al ways a practical or concrete activity. Gadamer ar­
gues that when we approach a text, we typically do so for the purpose 
of understanding its meaning. For that reason, we anticipate the com­
pleteness of the text and assume it can communicate a "unity of mean­
ing. "72 Other wise, the hermeneutic act becomes merely hypothetical. In­
terpretation occurs in a concrete context, not in some hypothetical, 
69. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 461-63; see also J.M. 
Balkin, Ideology as Cultural Software, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1221-23 (1995) (ac­
knowledging drawbacks of the metaphor of cultural software). 
70. In a related vein, Anthony Giddens writes: "[T]ransient encounters of daily 
life cannot be conceptually separated from the long-term development of institutions. 
The most casual exchange of words involves the speakers in the long-term history of 
the language via which their words are formed, and simultaneously in the continuing re­
production of that language.,, ANTHONY GIDDENS, PROFILES AND CRITIQUES IN SO­
CIAL THEORY 11 (1982). 
71. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 307. 
72. See id. at 293-94. 
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abstract never-never land. In the reality of a concrete context, we are 
able to grasp the point of a text without slipping into an infinite regress 
bereft of meaning.73 
Moreover, neither traditions nor prejudices are mere mental forms 
or ideas that can be replaced by simply imagining different forms or 
ideas. Prejudices and interests often are learned or absorbed in a deep 
sense; they become embodied in individuals. Prejudices and interests, 
then, are not like a pair of rose-colored glasses that can be removed and 
replaced with a pair of green-tinted glasses. To the contrary, once en­
trenched or learned, particular prejudices and interests are not easily 
changed or shaken, though they always remain contingent and poten­
tially alterable.74 
Additionally, prejudices, interests, and traditions arise from and are 
constituted by experiences that are mediated through language. And lan­
guage, as a practical activity, is communicated through concrete exper­
iences and actions.75 For example, a child learns through a multitude of 
social interactions the meaning of being a doctor in our society. The 
child might be a patient of a doctor who talks to and physically treats 
73. At a particular point in time, a text can seem to have a multiplicity of mean­
ings only if we imagine it as decontextualized, as existing in some abstract sense. But 
as Stanley Fish notes, we always encounter a text in a concrete context, and hence, the 
text always has a determinate meaning (though that meaning can change as the context 
changes). See Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech 
Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other 
Special Cases, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE - A READER, supra note 38, at 
243, 256. 
74. To me, Gadamer does not adequately make this point, although it is implicit in 
his approach. 
Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the embodiment of a practice suggests that prejudices 
and interests should be understood not merely as a "state of mind," but as a "state of 
the body." See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE Lome OF PRACTICE 68 (Richard Nice trans., 
Stanford Univ. Press 1990) (1980). In fact, Bourdieu writes that "[l]anguage is a body 
technique." PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 86 (John B. 
Thompson ed. & Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1991) (1982). Thus, we might understand language and tradition as being, in the words 
of Julia Annas, "socially embodied" or "embodied in various forms of social life." 
Julia Annas, Macintyre on Traditions, 18 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 388, 388-89 (1989) (dis­
cussing Alasdair Maclntyre's notion of tradition); see Feldman, The Persistence of 
Power, supra note 5, at 2258-61 (criticizing Habermas's argument that we can separate 
symbolic reproduction in a Iifeworld from material reproduction). 
75. James Boyd White writes: 
[O]ur acts of language are actions in the world, not just in our minds. Even when 
we think we are simply communicating information, or being rigorously and ex­
clusively intellectual, or just talking, we are in fact engaged in performances, in 
relation to others, that are ethical and political in character and that can be judged 
as such. 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION ix (1990). 
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the child; the child mi ght see his or her parents or other individuals in­
teract with physici ans; the child mi ght hear different people discuss 
doctors; and the child mi ght read books or watch movies or television 
sho ws that po rtray physicians. Over time, the child thus acquires the 
meanin g of bein g a doctor throu gh the accumulation of these exper­
iences, althou gh the meanin g is al ways mediated throu gh lan gua ge. 
That is, these social experiences gain meanin gful shape only throu gh 
lin guistic concepts already existin g in the community. Thus, the child 
eventually learns that a doctor talks in a particular manner, performs 
certain tasks, and wears a certain type of clo thin g. The child, in effect, 
c arries these ch aracteristics as prejudices that shape the child's concep­
tion or fore-understandin g of the role of physicians in the community. 
The child does not acquire these prejudices in some ideal world of ab­
stractions; instead, the child concretely experiences doctors and repre­
sentations or portray als of them.76 
At this point, it is worth notin g that my ar gument mer ges close to 
Patterson's ar gument. Patterson ar gues that underst andin g, as a practice 
or practical activity, provides the foo tin g  that prevents us from slidin g 
into an infinite interpretive re gress. I no w ar gue that postmodern inter­
pretivism does not send us slidin g into an in finite interpre tive re gress 
because the uni fied hermeneutic act includes the practical component of 
application. In fact, the similarity bet ween our ar guments on this point 
su gges ts that, perhaps, the differences bet ween our entire positions are 
less than at first appeared. Maybe the distinction bet ween Patterson's 
Witt gensteinian pra gmatism and my postmodern interpretivism is the 
proverbial distinction wi thout a difference.77 A fter all, we bo th reject 
hermeneutic foundationalism, and we both emphasize prere flective co g­
nition. Maybe, then, the disa greement is no more than a dispute over 
sem antics. Patterson re fers, first, to understandin g as prereflective co g­
nitive activity and, second, to interpre tation as deliberate reflection on 
the meanin g of a text. I re fer to all co gni tive activities, whe ther re flec­
tive or prere flective, as hermeneutic acts that include an interpretive 
component. 
76. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC­
TION OF REALITY (1967); Feldman, Exposing, supra note 5, at 1341-43 & nn.39-42; 
Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, supra note 5, at 710-11. See generally 
LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL lNvEsTIGATIONS 19e (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1958) (arguing that language is a form of life, and hence, philosophical 
questions arise when "language goes on holiday"). 
77. See generally RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, What Is the Difference that Makes a 
Difference? Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 58 (1986) 
(discussing whether the distinctions among Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty are 
significant). 
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In fact, I believe that with a bit of tinkering, we might get our defi­
nitions to match, and our disagreement would dissolve - almost. There 
is an additional problem. Our disagreement about terminology manifests 
a sharp political difference between us. Patterson attacks postmodern in­
terpretivism for textual indeterminacy, solipsistic relativism, and ulti­
mately, political conservatism. In fact, many others also have charged 
Gadamer with conservatism for too readily accepting the authority of 
tradition and the conventional meaning of the text.78 Ironically, how­
ever, this charge of political conservatism applies more accurately to 
Patterson than to Gadamer. Patterson's concept of understanding em­
bodies an uncritical acceptance of the normal or conventional. To 
Patterson, understanding arises from "conventional meanings"79 and is 
expressed by acting "properly"80 or "appropriately"81 in response to an 
utterance or request; acting improperly apparently indicates misunder­
standing, not resistance or criticism. Indeed, most tellingly, the crux of 
Patterson's argument seems to be that postmodern interpretivism goes 
wrong because it requires us (at least in his opinion) to use the terms 
"understanding" and "interpretation" in unconventional or unusual 
ways.82 According to Patterson's Wittgensteinian pragmatism, the mere 
fact that we ordinarily use words in a particular manner invests that us­
age with some normative priority or a presumption of rightness.83 Meta­
phorically speaking, Patterson tries to re-execute Socrates (the 
postmodern interpretivists) for questioning tradition.84 Hence, unsurpris-
78. See, e.g., John D. Caputo, Gadamer's Closet Essentialism: A Derridean Cri­
tique, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION 258, 258-59 (Diane P. Michelfelder & 
Richard E. Palmer eds., 1989); Jiirgen Habermas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and 
Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 335, 359-60 (Fred R. Dallmayr 
& Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Tum in Mod­
ern Theory: A Tum for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 874, 892, 957 (1989). 
79. Patterson states that we engage in interpretation only "when conventional 
meanings are called into question. [Therefore] interpretation is dependent upon conven­
tional understanding and practice." Patterson, supra note 6, at 54-55 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. at 21. 
81.  Id. at 20. 
82. For example, Patterson claims that interpretive universalism is "born of a lack 
of attention to some obvious features of ordinary understanding." Id. at 3. He contin­
ues: "[T]his [interpretive] account of the nature of legal understanding is profoundly 
misleading. It turns the ordinary into the mysterious, and it fails to account for the fact 
that understanding and interpretation are distinct activities." Id. at 7. 
83. For example, Richard Shusterman insists that we must distinguish understand­
ing as prereflective cognition from interpretation as reflective activity in order to defend 
the ordinary use of the word understanding. See Shusterman, supra note 29, at 195-99. 
He writes that "interpretation standardly implies some deliberate or at least conscious 
thinking, while understanding does not." Id. at 190. 
84. See generally RICHARD TARNAS. THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 
26-35 (1991) (comparing the Sophists, as skeptical pragmatists, with Socrates). 
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ingly, when Patterson muses about "the task of jurisprudence, "85 he in­
sists that it is largely descriptive, not critical: "The task of jurispru­
dence is the accurate description of the forms of argument used by 
lawyers to show the truth of propositions of law. "86 That is, jurispru­
dence should describe how lawyers use words in the practice of law. In 
short, Patterson's fear of relativism and nihilism induces him to retreat 
toward a Burkean acceptance of tradition and conventions.87 
Whereas Patterson seems truly conservative, Gadamer is poten­
tially radical in two ways. First, Gadamer insists that the interpreter 
must risk her prejudices by opening up to the meaning of the text. 
Gadamer refuses to endorse a hermeneutic vision in which an inter­
preter blithely imposes her preferred meaning on the text. Rather, the 
hermeneutic act should be a conversational or dialogical exchange be­
tween the interpreter and text. Through this hermeneutic act, the inter­
preter changes as meaning comes into being. Second, Gadamer's philo­
sophical hermeneutics contains a potential deconstructive component. 
While Gadamer emphasizes the anticipation of a complete and unified 
textual meaning, his approach also implicitly contains the seeds for a 
deconstructive attack on the conservative acceptance of textual mean­
ing.88 To develop this second point, I will now turn to Derridean decon­
struction and Balkin's argument concerning justice. 
85. Patterson, supra note 6, at 56. 
86. Id. Patterson continues by arguing: 
Jurisprudence should tum its attention away from the fixation on interpretation 
and study the ways in which lawyers go about the task of justifying propositions 
of law. Finally, we must continue to pay attention to the ways in which the mean­
ing of law is called into question and rival interpretations adjudicated. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Even here, where Patterson hints at a more critical purpose 
for jurisprudence, he casts it in a largely descriptive manner. He does not recommend 
intervening or participating in the questioning of the meaning of law, but rather he sug­
gests that we "pay attention" to the ways in which such questioning ordinarily occurs. 
It is not until the very last sentence of the article that Patterson finally suggests a 
stronger critical stance when he writes: "[T]he central task of jurisprudence is the per­
spicuous description and critical appraisal of our practices of legal justification." Id. 
87. Cf. George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurispru­
dence, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 545, 549, 558-65 (1996) (arguing that to later Wittgen­
stein and his followers, philosophy should be purely descriptive of ordinary language; 
therefore, critics have charged that this ordinary language type of approach to philoso­
phy fails to seek to critique and reconstruct language); see also Wmter, supra note 15, 
at 1867. 
88. Cf. Gerald L. Bruns, Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of the Legal Text, in 
LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE supra note 39, at 23, 26 
(arguing that Gadamer can be interpreted as reactionary or radical). 
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II. O N  POSTMODERN lNTERPRETIVISM AND JUSTICE 
A. The Relation Between Philosophical Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction 
185 
As a manifestation of postmodern interpretivism, Derridean decon­
struction shares much in common with philosophical hermeneutics. 89 
No less so than hermeneutics, deconstruction can be understood � an 
attempt to identify the irreducible conditions of human understanding.90 
Both Gadamer and Derrida explore how we come to understand texts 
despite rejecting the foundationalist metaphysics of modemism.91 In 
Derridean terms, meaning is never grounded on a stable signified; 
rather, there "is always already" a play of signifiers.92 Derrida states: 
From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We 
think only in signs. Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign . . . . .  
One could call play th e  absence o f  the transcendental signified as limit­
lessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of . . .  the metaphysics 
of presence. 93 
• 
Hence, deconstruction echoes the central ontological tenet of her­
meneutics that we are always and already interpreting. As Derrida says, 
89. Many critics of deconstruction mistakenly assume that it "encourages the idea 
of criticism as a kind of free-for-all hermeneutic romp, an activity where no constraints 
apply save those brought to bear by some arbitrary set of interpretative codes and con­
ventions." NORRIS, supra note 5, at 137. I agree with Norris, Balkin, Staten, and others 
who argue that this characterization of deconstruction presents only one (distorted) man­
ifestation of it; Derrida does not subscribe to this type of "sophistical freeplay." Id. at 
151; see id. at 49-53, 140; HENRY STATEN, WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA (1984); 
Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 152. 
90. See supra text accompanying note 39; cf. Diane Michelfelder & Richard 
Palmer, Introduction to DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 18, at 1, 7-9 
(noting that it can be argued that Derrida is the supreme hermeneutician of the twentieth 
century, and Gadamer the ultimate deconstructionist). 
91. The relation between Derrida and Wittgenstein is, of course, problematic. 
Compare STATEN, supra note 89, at 1, 64-108 (claiming that the later Wittgenstein 
achieves a consistent deconstructionist standpoint, in the Derridian sense) with 
NEWfON GARVER & SEUNG-CHONG LEE, DERRIDA AND WITTGENSTEIN (1994) 
(arguing that though Wittgenstein and Derrida share similarities, Wittgenstein presents 
the stronger position considering their significant differences). 
92. Derrida writes that "the signified is originarily and essentially (and not only 
for a finite and created spirit) trace, that it is always already in the position of the signi­
fier." DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 73; see id. at 47, 50; see also 
JAMESON, supra note 5, at 96. Derrida and Gadamer use the term "play" in different 
ways. See Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and Deconstruction: Gadamer and De"ida in 
Dialogue, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 75, 82; Neal Ox­
enhandler, The Man with Shoes of Wind: The De"ida-Gadamer Encounter, in DIA­
LOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 265, 266. 
93. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 50; see DERRIDA, PosmoNS, 
supra note 3, at 20. 
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there is no foundation for the "coming into being" of signs.94 The con­
tinual play or coming into being of signs or signifiers relates to Der­
rida's central concept of differance. 
[T]he signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient 
presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every 
concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the 
other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences. 
Such a play, differance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the 
possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in gen­
eral. For the same reason, differance, which is not a concept, is not sim­
ply a word, that is, what is generally represented as the calm, present, 
and self-referential unity of concept and phonic material.95 
Just as Gadamer emphasizes that our prejudices arise from com­
munal traditions, Derrida argues that we always borrow concepts "from 
the text of a heritage. "96 We can never escape our heritage or, in 
Gadamerian terms, step outside of our horizon. According to Derrida, 
we are limited to "givens belonging to the discourse of our time,"97 and 
hence, even "deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its 
own work. "98 That is, deconstruction always necessarily uses and rein­
scribes the metaphysics and linguistic structures that it seeks to decon­
struct.99 Moreover, to Derrida, as well as to Gadamer, the givens of our 
94. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 48. 
95. DERRIDA, Differance, supra note 3, at 11 .  Derrida further states: 
The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid 
at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, 
referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no 
element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself 
is not simply present. T his interweaving results in each "element" . • .  being con­
stituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or 
system. This interweaving, this textile, is the t ext produced only in the transfor­
mation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the sys­
tem, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, dif­
ferences and traces of traces . • . .  
. . . Differance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differ­
ences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This 
spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of differance indicates this 
indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by 
or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals 
without which the "full" terms would not signify, would not function. 
DERRIDA, PosmoNs, supra note 3, at 26-27. 
96. DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 3, at 285. 
97. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 70. 
98. Id. at 24. 
99. Derrida describes this process as follows: 
[A]ll these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of 
circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relation between the his­
tory of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no 
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heritage - our communal traditions - neither are fixed and precisely 
bounded entities nor are they passed on to individuals through some 
precise method or mechanical process.100 
If philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction share so much in 
common, then what are the differences? In a sense, Gadamer pauses to 
celebrate moments of meaning and truth, while Derrida does not.101 
Both Gadamer and Derrida stress that any text or event has many po­
tential meanings, many possible truths; no single meaning remains fixed 
or stable in all contexts. Both would agree that "truth keeps happen­
ing." 102 Yet, while Gadamer therefore considers the meaning of a text to 
be inexhaustible, Derrida considers it undecidable.103 To Gadamer, a de­
terminate meaning arises in each concrete context, but because contexts 
can vary, the potential meaning of a text is never exhausted. Gadamer, 
as already discussed, emphasizes that the unified hermeneutic act in­
cludes a practical component (application), so that we anticipate the 
completeness of the text and assume it can communicate a "unity of 
meaning." 104 Thus, because Gadamer focuses on the practicality of the 
hermeneutic act, he tends to view understanding primarily as a positive 
and empowering experience.105 
Gadamer consequently downplays the deconstructive component 
that presents itself in the hermeneutic act, even as he implicitly suggests 
it. He explains that our prejudices both enable and constrain under­
standing and interpretation. Prejudices not only open us to the possibil­
ity of understanding, but they also necessarily
· 
constrain and direct our 
understanding and communication. One's life within a community and 
its cultural traditions thus always limits or distorts one's range of vision, 
sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphys­
ics. We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is foreign to this 
history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not al­
ready had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of pre­
cisely what it seeks to contest 
DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 3, at 280-81. 
100. See BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS, supra note 5, at 23. . 
101. In more mundane terms, if Gadamer and Derrida were looking at a glass of 
water, Gadamer probably would say it is half full, while Derrida likely would say it is 
half empty. 
102. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9; see id. at 200 (noting that the truth of a 
text exceeds each understanding); cf. BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS, supra note 5, at 31  
(stating that postmodern culture "is characterized by the overabundance of  meanings"). 
103. See MADISON, supra note 3, at 1 15; Hoy, supra note 3, at 54. 
104. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND MErnoo, supra note 2, at 293-94. 
105. See MADISON, supra note 3, at 1 13-14 (observing that Gadamer's emphasis 
on application separates hermeneutics from deconstruction). 
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o: what one can possibly perceive or understand.106 Furthermore, 
Gadamer emphasizes that because we are historical beings who live in 
tradition, just as we live in a community, tradition is something in 
which we constantly participate. Thus, we constantly constitute and re­
constitute our tradition, our culture, and our community as we engage 
in hermeneutic actions.107 This constant reconstitution always is simulta­
neously constructive and destructive. On the one hand, it is constructive 
because we constantly build new traditions and communities, constantly 
adding to our already existing traditions and communities through inter­
pretation and understanding. Through hermeneutic actions, we include 
new concepts, interests, prejudices, and participants in our traditions 
and communities. On the other hand, this reconstitution is also destruc­
tive - distortive and exclusive - insofar as we weaken or eliminate 
previously existing traditions and communities and exclude concepts, 
interests, prejudices, and participants.108 In short, as Gadamer articulates 
the hermeneutic act, interpretation and understanding are distortive and 
destructive in two ways: first, our prejudices are manifestations of 
power that constrain the possibilities for understanding; and second, the 
reconstitution of tradition (also a manifestation of power) necessarily 
destroys and excludes certain prejudices, interests, and participants. 
Consequently, coercion, domination, exclusion, and other distortive ef­
fects of power are always part of the hermeneutic act.109 The decon­
structive component of hermeneutics hides within these destructive and 
distortive effects. 
Thus, Gadamer's articulation of philosophical hermeneutics con­
tains deconstructive potential, yet he fails to pursue it.110 Here, then, is 
106. See STANLEY FISH, Critical Self-Consciousness, or Can We Know What 
We're Doing?, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 436, 450-55 (1989). 
107. See JAMES BoYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING (1984); 
James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REv. 835, 867 (1986). 
108. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17 (1988) (claiming 
that whenever a community rests upon an authoritative text, different modes of interpre­
tation are likely to splinter that community); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 91 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 
Y ALB LJ. 1601 (1986); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A 
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 241 1, 2414-15 (1989) (arguing that storytelling 
both builds and destroys community). 
109. See Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 2262-66; Feldman, 
Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, supra note 5, at 705-31; cf. James Risser, The 
Two Faces of Socrates: Gadamer/Derrida, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, 
supra note 78, at 176, 179-83 (suggesting that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics 
has deconstructive potential). 
1 10. Gadamer's grasp of the deconstructive potential of philosophical hermeneu­
tics emerges most clearly in his criticism of Habermas's ideal speech situation. See 
Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 2258-66; Hoy, supra note 3, at 61-
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the crux of the distinction between Gadamer and Derrida. Whereas 
Gadamer focuses on the constructive and enabling power of the herme­
neutic situation, Derrida focuses on its destructive and disabling compo­
nent. Yet both parts are always and already present, as if there were a 
hermeneutic and sociological law of conservation of power: if a herme­
neutic act produces meaning and empowers certain individuals and so­
cietal groups, it simultaneously represses and destroys potential mean­
ing and disempowers other individuals and groups.111 Thus, for 
example, Gadamer describes how tradition enables us to open to the 
meaning of a text, but Derrida warns us that the authority of tradition is 
"purchased by deep violence."112 Tradition opens us to understanding 
because in part it provides an authoritative background context for the 
hermeneutic act; tradition thus operates most effectively when it is for­
gotten from conscious memory. But Derrida wants to remind us about 
tradition, to bring the background to the foreground, and to underscore 
how tradition often establishes its authority through brutality and 
duplicity. 
Because Derrida concerns himself with the disempowering and de­
structive quality of the hermeneutic situation, he cares little about de­
ciding among the many potential meanings or truths of a text. Dis­
empowerment, quite simply, is not about making decisions; rather, it is 
about lacking the power to decide. Derrida is not interested in the prac­
tical component of the hermeneutic act since he does not seek to pursue 
or reconstruct a unified meaning for the text. To the contrary, Derrida 
seeks to find and highlight the trace of the Other that always hides in 
the margins of our understanding. Derrida seeks to uncover the violence 
that necessarily exists when we understand a text - the violence that is 
inevitably obscured in the practical quest for a usable and therefore uni­
fied meaning. To Derrida, violence manifests itself in the hermeneutic 
definition, exclusion, denial, and oppression of the Other - a con­
cealed outsider - and stands as an irreducible condition (or limit) of 
62. However, John Brenkman argues that Gadamer does not sufficiently recognize the 
distortive power of tradition; rather, he accepts tradition as authoritative. See JOHN 
BRENKMAN, CuLTURE AND DOMINATION 30-38 (1987); cf. WARNKE, supra note 2, 
at 91, 99 (questioning whether Gadamer conservatively accepts tradition). 
1 1 1. I do not mean to suggest that the total value or quantity of power always re­
mains the same through all social and hermeneutic events. Rather, I suggest that every 
hermeneutic event is both constructive and destructive, though any particular event may 
be more one than the other. Cf. Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 
2282-88 (noting that not all traditions and communities are equally distortive and 
exclusive). 
1 12. Caputo, supra note 78, at 263. 
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human understanding.1 13 Within the hermeneutic process of understand­
ing, we always and already define some Other; we necessarily deny the 
potential meanings arising from some other perspective and exclude 
those potential meanings from our communal traditions. Without the 
. Other, without the trace of denied potential meaning, "no meaning 
would appear" at all.114 Indeed, the Other is not just on the outside, but 
rather the Other is the outside - the location of the Other defines the 
outside.115 Thus, understanding is a political act because, in announcing 
the meaning of the text, it normatively and substantively defines inside 
and outside. No preexisting border exists. Hence, Derridean deconstruc­
tion also is political: it uncovers the hidden, the oppressed, the violated, 
the denied - the Other.116 Gadamer may want to open to the Otherness 
of the text, but Derrida wants to reveal the Otherness suppressed by our 
understanding of the text. 
An imaginary dialogue between Gadamer and Derrida might go as 
follows: 
Gadamer: "Our participation in tradition enables us to understand 
texts." 
113. Derrida states: 
The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, articulates its possibil­
ity in the entire field of the entity . . .  which metaphysics has defined as the be­
ing-present starting from the occulted movement of the trace. The trace must be 
thought before the entity. But the movement of the trace is necessarily occulted, 
it produces itself as self-occultation. When the other announces itself as such, it 
presents itself in the dissimulation of itself . . . .  The field of the entity, before be­
ing determined as the field of presence, is structured according to the diverse 
possibilities - genetic and structural - of the trace. The presentation of the 
other as such, that is to say the dissimulation of its "as such," has always already 
begun and no structure of the entity escapes it. 
DERRIDA. GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 47. 
Norris places Derrida in the Kantian tradition insofar as Derrida seeks to identify 
the irreducible conditions of human understanding. But, as Norris points out, Derrida 
uses the Kantian transcendental method in an unusual way: "[Derrida has a] very differ­
ent way of posing the transcendental question: namely, by asking what conditions of 
impossibility mark out the limits of Kantian conceptual critique." NORRIS, supra note 
5, at 200. That is, Derrida can be understood as asking what are the conditions that 
must be denied or oppressed to render understanding possible. 
1 14. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 62. 
1 15. For example, when Derrida deconstructs the privileging of speech over writ­
ing, he states that writing will always "be the outside." Id. at 31.  In other words, writ­
ing, which is in this case the Other or the supplement, is not just on the outside, but 
rather it is the outside. See also DERRIDA, Plato, supra note 3 (deconstructing Plato's 
Phaedrus, which focuses on the importance of speech over writing). 
1 16. Cf. STEPHEN K. WHITE, POLmCAL THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM 16 
(1991) (recognizing that deconstruction is political because it often exposes power 
where reason alone previously appeared). 
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Derrida: "Yes, but what legitimates tradition? Tradition arises 
partly through violence and deception." 
Gadamer: "Your desire for legitimacy merely reenacts modernist 
metaphysics. What do you want? A stable foundation?" 
Derrida: "You are right. But you make exactly the point I am try­
ing to stress. There is no legitimating ground for meaning other than 
tradition, but there is, in turn, no legitimating ground for tradition itself. 
Tradition is neither completely legitimate nor illegitimate.117 Under­
standing, therefore, necessarily is based on blindness and hypocrisy as 
we ignore and deny the violence and deception within tradition." 1 18 
Gadamer: "Yes, but that's exactly the point. We do communicate. 
We do understand. These are practical activities that necessarily con­
tinue without legitimating foundations." 
Derrida: "Yes, but the violence, the oppression, the denial . . . .  " 
And so on. To Gadamer, this debate is inexhaustible. A new per­
spective constantly comes into being as our horizons shift, but nonethe­
less we continue along in our pra�atic fashion - communicating, un­
derstanding, and interpreting. To Derrida, this tension between 
philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction is undecidable. We are 
caught in a never-ending dialectic between the necessity and inade­
quacy of our linguistic forms. Both Derrida and Gadamer might agree, 
however, that we do not need to choose between hermeneutics and 
deconstruction. In fact, a choice does not even make sense: 119 philo­
sophical hermeneutics and deconstruction represent different planes or 
1 17. In writing about law and justice, Derrida observes: 
Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the 
law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a vi­
olence without ground. Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, in 
the sense of "illegal." They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding 
moment. 
Derrida, Law, supra note 3, at 943. 
1 18. See NORRIS, supra note 3, at 197-98. 
1 19. For example, Derrida suggests that he, like everybody else, engages in the 
practical activity of interpretation when he acknowledges that he always is "analyzing, 
judging, evaluating this or that discourse." Jacques Derrida, Like the Sound of the Sea 
Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 1 4  CRITICAL INQUIRY 590, 631 (Peggy 
Kamuf trans., 1988) [hereinafter Derrida, Sound of the Sea]; cf DERRIDA, Structure, 
supra note 3, at 292-93 (stating that two forms of interpretation are "absolutely irrecon­
cilable," so there is no "question of choosing"). Gadamer maintains that hermeneutics 
and deconstruction both try to continue Heidegger's effort to overcome metaphysics, 
though they do so along different paths. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Destruktion and 
Deconstruction, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 102, 109; 
see also Fred Dallmayr, Self and Other: Gadamer and the Hermeneutics of Difference, 
5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 515-16 (1993) (observing that to Gadamer, deconstruction 
contains insights that are germane to hermeneutics). 
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axes in postmodern interpretivism. They both help us to comprehend 
the hermeneutic act, or how we come to understand a text (legal or oth­
erwise). Philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction thus comple­
ment each other in that hermeneutics illuminates the affirmative coming 
into being of meaning, while deconstruction stresses the limits of com­
munication and understanding.120 This recognition takes us to Balkin 
and his discussion of deconstruction and justice. 
B. Postmodern Vertigo 
In 1990, Derrida published Force of Law: The "Mystical Founda­
tion of Authority. "121 At that time, Derrida noted that although decon­
struction often had appeared not to address the problem of justice, 
deconstruction had "done nothing but address [justice], if only ob­
liquely, unable to do so directly."122 In Force of Law, however, Derrida 
focused on the relation between deconstruction and justice by exploring 
how the violence (or force) of law often is deemed just or legitimate.123 
Derrida concluded that a " 'mystical' limit" appears at the origin of 
law as law claims to rest on ultimately ungrounded authority.124 Justice 
itself, according to Derrida, is always displaced; it is never fully exper­
ienced. Justice is an "infinite demand:" 125 we constantly desire justice, 
but fulfillment of our desire always remains just beyond our reach.126 
120. Using Balkin's terms, I might argue that philosophical hermeneutics and 
deconstruction exist in a "nested opposition." As Balkin describes this state: 
To deconstruct a conceptual opposition is to show that the conceptual opposition 
is a nested opposition - in other words, that the two concepts bear relations of 
mutual dependence as well as mutual differentiation. For example, we might dis­
cover that they have elements in common, which become salient in some con­
texts, but that in other contexts we note very important differences between them, 
so that they are not the same in all respects. In fact, we would note that the 
meaning of each depends in part on our ability to distinguish it from the other in 
some contexts. 
Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 153. 
121. Derrida, Law, supra note 3. 
122. Id. at 935. Derrida adds that deconstructionists seek to intervene and change 
the polis and social world, not through strategic and controlled intervention, but "in the 
sense of maximum intensification of a transformation in progress." Id. at 931-33. 
123. Derrida asked the following question: what is the difference between, on the 
one hand, the force of law that is just or, at least, is deemed legitimate, and on the other 
hand, force or violence that is unjust? See id. at 927. 
124. Id. at 943. 
125. Id. at 955. 
126. Derrida states: 
[T]here is no justice without this experience, however impossible it may be, of 
aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a desire, a demand for 
justice whose structure wouldn't be an experience of aporia would have no 
chance to be what it is, namely, a call for justice. Every time that something 
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Balkin's article, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Jus­
tice, 121 reacts to Derrida by, in effect, asking why we constantly desire 
justice when we seem forever unable to reach it. How do we, in other 
words, explain the infinite demand for justice?128 Balkin's article, by 
trying to explain this infinite demand, can be read not only as a re­
sponse to Derrida, but also, in part, as a response to Patterson's charge 
that postmodern interpretivism is relativistic, solipsistic, and undermines 
social critique.129 Balkin declares unequivocally that deconstruction "is 
decidedly not nihilistic."130 I agree with this sentiment and with many 
of Balkin's other pronouncements regarding deconstruction and justice. 
For example, I concur with Balkin when he says: 
The deconstructor critiques for the purpose of betterment; she seeks out 
unjust or inappropriate conceptual hierarchies in order to assert a better 
ordering. Hence, her argument is always premised on the' possibility of 
an alternative to existing norms that is not simply different, but also more 
just, even if the results of this deconstruction are imperfect and subject to 
further deconstruction. Such a deconstruction assumes that it is possible 
to speak meaningfully of the more or the less just; it decidedly rejects the 
claim that nothing is more just than anything else, or that all things are 
equally just.131 
Nonetheless, I strongly disagree with Balkin's ultimate conclusions 
regarding deconstruction and justice. He seemingly has experienced 
postmodern vertigo: an avowed postmodernist, he looked in the mirror, 
and saw another mirror, and another, and another. Suddenly, he felt 
sick, as if he were spinning out of control. So, instinctively, he reached 
down and grabbed for a piece of firm, modernist ground. Balkin insists 
comes to pass or turns out well, every time that we placidly apply a good rule to 
a particular case, to a correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant 
judgment, we can be sure that law (droit) may find itself accounted for, but cer­
tainly not justice. Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, 
and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calcu­
late with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as im­
probable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the 
decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule. 
Id. at 947. 
127. Balkin, supra note 7. 
128. Although Balkin focuses his discussion on Derrida's Force of Law, Balkin 
also discusses Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 812 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1989), and Derrida, Sound of the Sea, supra note 
119. 
129. I do not mean to suggest that Balkin expressly intended to respond to Patter­
son. He did not In fact, Patterson's article was published after Balkin's. Nonetheless, 
Balkin responds to the type of charge articulated by Patterson. 
130. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 142. 
131. Id. at 1 141-42; see supra note 120 (I am comfortable with Balkin's concept 
of nested oppositions). 
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that for Derrida's arguments on justice to make sense, Derrida "must be 
committed to a transcendental conception of deconstruction, whether or 
not he specifically recognizes this fact."132 I do not wish to debate ex­
actly what Derrida must be committed to or what he intended to write; 
I am, however, interested in further exploring the relation between 
deconstruction and justice. In particular, Balkin's concept of transcen­
dental deconstruction appears intriguing and original, but is ultimately 
misleading. 
According to Balkin, transcendental deconstruction is the only way 
to explain our infinite demand for justice, our "inexhaustible drive." 133 
Balkin writes: 
The essence of what I am calling transcendental deconstruction [is] the 
interval between the human capacity for judgment and evaluation that in­
evitably and necessarily transcends the creations of culture, and the pre­
scriptions and evaluations of that culture, which in turn articulate and ex­
emplify human values like justice. It is in this sense that transcendental 
deconstruction depends, as Platonism itself does, on a conception of val­
ues that "go beyond" the positive norms of culture and convention. But 
these transcendent values do not come to us in a fully determinate form; 
they need culture to tum their inchoate sense into an articulated concep­
tion. And these transcendent values do not exist in an imaginary Platonic 
Heaven; they exist rather in the wellsprings of the human soul. 134 
Hence, we have an inchoate sense of and inexhaustible drive for justice 
that do not arise from culture or tradition, but rather emerge from "the 
wellsprings of the human soul." 135 All cultural manifestations of our 
"sense of justice"136 are inadequate because they fail to fulfill our urge 
to attain justice; our sense of justice necessarily transcends concrete cul­
tural productions.137 Since our sense of and urge for justice transcend 
culture, Balkin posits their emergence from the human soul. 
132. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 154 (emphasis added). 
133. Id. at 1140. 
134. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added in part). 
135. Balkin elsewhere refers to justice as one of "those indeterminate values or 
urges located in the human soul, which human beings articulate through positive moral­
ity and cultural conventions, and which nevertheless always escape this articulation." 
Id. at 1139. 
136. See, e.g., id. at 1141, 1 155. 
137. As Balkin observes: 
[H]uman cultural creations will always fail to be perfectly just, but not because 
they are defective copies of a determinate standard. Their imperfection arises 
from the necessary inadequation that must exist between an indeterminate and in­
exhaustible urge and any concrete and determinate articulation of justice. This re­
lationship of inadequacy between culture and value is what we mean by "tran­
scendence." The goal of transcendental deconstruction is to rediscover this 
transcendence where it has been forgotten. 
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In fact, Balkin surprisingly insists that transcendental deconstruc­
tion saves us from nihilism, that persistent modernist hobgoblin. In 
Balkin's own words, "[A] transcendental approach to deconstruction 
[is] the only approach that can rescue deconstruction from the nihilistic 
abyss of infinite meaning." 138 Balkin reasons that the transcendental 
reach into the wellsprings of the human soul is necessary for social cri­
tique. Critique, he claims, cannot be immanent; it cannot arise from 
within culture itself. 
[T]o say that positive norms are inadequate - and hence in order to 
deconstruct them - we must refer to values that lie beyond the norms 
we are critiquing and that serve as the source of our criticism, even if we 
believe that the values we wish to uphold are to some extent realized in 
our culture. Suppose that we denied that we need concern ourselves with 
transcendental values: Suppose we assert that we are only interested in 
engaging in an "immanent" critique. In other words, we say that we are 
using one aspect of our cultural norms to critique other aspects, and 
therefore we need make no reference to anything beyond the positive 
norms of our culture. For example, we might use the commitment to 
equality expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to criticize the lack of 
civil rights for homosexuals in the United States. The question remains, 
however, why we saw a particular aspect of our cultural practices as a 
worthy basis for our critique and another aspect as unworthy. Since both 
are equally aspects of our culture, culture by itself cannot serve as a 
norm to decide between them.139 
Balkin admits that one might nonetheless insist that we can use 
one aspect of our culture to critique other aspects. Balkin argues, how­
ever, that to do so we must allow one element of our culture to take 
precedence over another merely because it predominates quantitatively 
throughout society. I agree with Balkin's rejection of this rather 
nonradical form of critique, which would do nothing more than con­
servatively reinforce the status quo.140 But Balkin then claims that in or­
der to explain how we are enabled to critique our own cultural norms, 
we must turn to "transcendent norms of justice." To Balkin, there is no 
other way to attain a critical viewpoint. Again, he maintains that these 
norms transcend culture: "Although we may find these norms partially 
realized in portions of our own culture, these inadequate articulations 
do not exhaust their meaning for us." 141 And more important, if the 
Id. at 1141. 
138. Id. at 1 155 (emphasis added). 
139. Id. at 1175 (footnote omitted). 
140. See id. 
141. Id. at 1 175-76 (emphasis added). 
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norms transcend culture, they must, in Balkin's opinion, arise from the 
human soul. 
By positing a human soul that somehow stands prior to and be­
yond the reach of culture - a precultural human soul - Balkin be­
comes a type of neo-liberal, emphasizing the individual and her per­
sonal responsibility. Balkin, naturally, urges us to follow his lead: 
[We must] abandon antihumanism and to reemphasize the importance of 
individual subjects in the creation of a culture that in tum creates 
them . . . .  [Derrida's] arguments about justice become incoherent unless 
he assumes the existence of individuals who are more than the products 
of cultural writing, and who can bear a responsibility to others, whether 
this responsibility is infinite or indefinite.142 
Balkin's argument suggests that either the individual stands prior 
to and above culture or the individual becomes a culturally programmed 
automaton. Faced with this choice, Balkin of course insists that the in­
dividual must stand prior to and above culture; otherwise, the concept 
of personal responsibility becomes moot. By thus separating the indi­
vidual subject from the cultural (external) world, Balkin reenacts mod­
ernist metaphysics - which postmodern interpretivism of course re­
jects. This metaphysical return to modernism pushes Balkin along 
toward other errors, as hermetic modernist lines and categories begin to 
appear. For instance, I agree when Balkin argues that deconstruction 
can be understood, in part, as a method, but in his hands, deconstruc­
tion appears to become no more than a method - a method to be used 
by responsible neo-liberal individuals as they pursue certain goals or 
values, such as justice.143 Hence, Balkin suggests that deconstruction 
and justice are radically distinct. Indeed, he calls his own article an 
"encounter between deconstruction and justice,"144 which resembles an 
"encounter between two parties."145 He envisions justice as a human 
value and drive, while deconstruction becomes a method that merely 
helps us pursue our sense of justice. 
1 42. Id. at 1185. Balkin expressly acknowledges the tendency to modernist liber­
alism inherent in his position: "[W]hen Derrida discusses [ethical responsibilities], one 
could easily be forgiven for mistaking his discourse with familiar liberal notions of au­
tonomy and free will." Id. at 1 186. 
1 43. Cf. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TExAs L. REV. 1627, 
1 694-95 (1991) (accusing Balkin of using deconstruction as just another analytical tool 
because he mistakenly sees Derrida through subject-object metaphysics). 
-144. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 131.  
1 45. Id. 
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Balkin suddenly looks like Kant reincarnate.146 Just as Kant's tran­
scendental argument posits a noumenal self existing outside of the phe­
nomenal world, Balkin's transcendental argument posits a human soul 
existing prior to and above culture. Kant does so to explain human ex­
perience and knowledge without sacrificing free will, while Balkin does 
so to explain our inchoate sense of and inexhaustible drive for justice 
without sacrificing individual responsibility. Postmodern interpretivism, 
however, renders Balkin's Kantian turn unnecessary. Interpretivism does 
not undermine responsibility and the drive for justice, as Balkin fears. 
Balkin, in fact, has it exactly backward. 
C. On Justice 
Postmodern interpretivism can explain how we come to understand 
justice as a value and as an inexhaustible drive. Although not a neat di­
vision, philosophical hermeneutics contributes more to our understand­
ing of justice as a value, while deconstruction contributes more to our 
understanding of the urge for justice. From a Gadamerian viewpoint, 
justice is a contested concept within our communal traditions. As with 
any concept, we open to the meaning of justice, not because our souls 
transcend culture, but rather because we participate in our communal 
traditions an.d culture. Contrary to Balkin's suggestion, oilr sense of jus­
tice does not come from outside our own cultural context or horizon, 
but from within it. The ontological quality of our being-in-the-world 
does not undermine justice or eliminate responsibility to others. Instead, 
the meanings of justice and responsibility come into being exactly be­
cause of our being-in-the-world.147 
In short, our sense or meaning of justice is socially produced. Con­
sequently, from this perspective, Balkin's argument immediately goes 
awry when he designates the human soul as the origin or wellspring for 
our sense of and urge for justice. By positing a precultural human soul, 
Balkin ignores one of the central messages of postmodern interpretiv­
ism: that we can never be outside of our own horizon. We always and 
already stand within our communal traditions or culture. There is no 
outside. Even if we are born with some precultural drives or values -
such as justice - our being-in-the-world is so culturally saturated that 
a search for a precultural pearl buried somewhere beneath the cultural 
146. For a collection of some of Kant's most important writings, see lMMANuEL 
KANT. KA.NT SELECTIONS (Theodore M. Greene ed., 1929). 
147. Hence, Balkin appears to contradict the thrust of his argument when he writes 
that "culture and language do not efface human autonomy but are the conditions of its 
very possibility." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 186. 
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waves seems at best irrelevant and at worst nonsensical. We should fo­
cus not on a futile search for pristine pearls, but rather on understanding 
the social and cultural construction of communication, values, and so­
cial reality.148 
Besides explaining how we come to have a sense or value of jus­
tice, philosophical hermeneutics also helps us to understand our inex­
haustible urge for justice - that is, the impatient movement of our 
sense of justice. As already stated, justice is a contested concept within 
our communal traditions. If truth keeps happening, as philosophical her­
meneutics maintains, then the truth or meaning of justice keeps happen­
ing. The meaning of justice cannot be exhausted; it moves with our 
shifting horizons as we enter into ever-new contexts.149 Moreover, our 
inexhaustible drive for justice is linked to the movement of tradition. As 
previously discussed, even our traditions are constantly being trans­
formed. Traditions are neither fixed and precisely bounded entities nor 
are they passed on to individuals through some precise method or 
mechanical process. The boundaries of any tradition are always con­
tested, always constituted and reconstituted, and this constant reconsti­
tution always is simultaneously constructive and destructive. Thus, 
while the concept of a tradition helps us to grasp or understand the so­
cial construction of reality - our being-in-the-world - we should not 
attempt to reify or reduce any actual tradition (or even the concept of a 
148. Balkin's turn to precultural human drives and values is especially surprising 
given that he apparently has accepted the postmodernist emphasis on culture and tradi­
tion in his other writings. For example, in another recent article, he notes: 
A jurisprudence of the subject is above all a cultural jurisprudence, for it is cul­
ture that creates legal subjects as subjects . . . •  
The beholder [or subject] is not fully in control of what she sees; she is part 
of a larger legal and political culture that shapes the very forms of her under­
standing. She does not choose the terms of her ideology or social construction. 
Rather she chooses through them; they form the framework within which her 
choices are understood and made. 
Balkin, Understanding, supra note 36, at 108. Balkin's unexpected transition, however, 
is not unprecedented in critical theory. In a somewhat similar transformation, Max 
Horkheimer moved from a critique of ideology to a struggle for a "theological mo­
ment" in philosophy that emphasized a human longing to transcend reality. See DA YID 
HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRrr!CAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS 198 
(1980). 
149. Consequently, I would avoid abstract and definitive statements regarding the 
content of justice. For example, in many contexts, I would agree with Balkin's state­
ment that "[t]he demand for an increase of justice is not necessarily the demand for in­
creased responsibility. It is rather the demand for an appropriate apportionment of re­
sponsibility." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1150 (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, I cannot 
accede to the decontextual thrust of his very next sentence: "That is what 'just' means 
- neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount of responsibility for each 
person." Id. (emphasis added). 
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tradition) into a single linguistic formulation or a fixed object.1so Cer­
tainly, then, specific concepts such as justice, which are parts of our tra­
ditions, necessarily remain constantly in flux. The movement of tradi­
tion, in short, helps drive our insatiable urge for justice. 
Although philosophical hermeneutics thus facilitates comprehen­
sion of our inexhaustible urge for justice, deconstruction more fully il­
luminates this urge. Translating our Gadamerian analysis into Derridean 
terms, we would say that any conception or meaning of justice is 
merely a signifier, not a stable signified. There is a continual play of 
justice: justice is never sufficiently present to halt the play of differ­
ences.1s1 Whereas Gadamer would consider the meaning of justice to be 
inexhaustible, Derrida would consider it undecidable. In any context, 
whenever we label an event or action as just, there is necessarily the 
trace of the Other hiding in the margins of our understanding. Within 
each hermeneutic act in which the meaning of justice comes into being, 
there is injustice. Each act o
J 
justice violently and duplicitously ex­
cludes, denies, and oppresses ·some Other.1s2 Hence, justice cannot be 
fulfilled; it is always displaced.1s3 
Balkin, then, mistakenly argues that Derridean deconstruction must 
be augmented in order to explain our inexhaustible drive for justice. Be­
cause of this mistake, he looks outside of deconstruction to the well­
springs of the human soul. But deconstruction does not need to be aug­
mented: the play of signifiers drives our sense of justice. As 
Christopher Norris declares, "deconstruction is always already at 
150. See Adam Thurschwell, Reading the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 275, 
312-17 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1994). 
151. To a degree, my understanding of the relation between deconstruction and 
justice tends to merge Foucault with Derrida. Foucault tends to be oriented to the socio­
logical and historical, while Derrida tends to be oriented to the philosophical. See ROY 
BOYNE, FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA: THE OTHER SIDE OF REASON 114  (1990); Hoy, 
supra note 3, at 58-62. Compare DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3 with 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) and 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978). To 
me, justice is a sociological phenomenon, not merely a philosophical question. 
152. The social theorist Niklas Luhmann, in articulating the autopoietic theory of 
law, explains that a legal system must have a binary code - justice versus injustice -
and must exclude both contradictions - justice is injustice, or injustice is justice. See 
Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 136, 140 (Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen trans.) (1989). From this viewpoint, then, one can easily understand why so 
many legal scholars consider deconstruction so threatening to a legal system. The con­
cept of a legal system, at least as described by Luhmann, is destabilized by the decon­
structive notion that justice always contains injustice. 
153. Cf. Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in LEGAL HERME­
NEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 297, 305-06 (observ­
ing that every horizon of understanding is itself an engine of change). 
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work."154 Balkin's conception of the soul gives us nothing that, in our 
being-in-the-world, we do not already have - an insatiable urge for 
justice. Yet, in return for his transcendental effort, Balkin suffers a sig­
nificant political cost. By positing the human soul as the source of our 
sense of and urge for justice, Balkin obscures a radical political point 
- that humans have a propensity to perpetrate at least as much injus­
tice as justice. In fact, I could argue (but I will not) that human history 
- the Holocaust, slavery, the Inquisition, Jim Crow - demonstrates an 
inexhaustible drive for cruelty and indifference. In this light, Balkin's 
human soul appears just a bit too noble and cheerful. 
Perhaps Balkin's modernist metaphysical twist, which induced him 
to separate sharply deconstruction from justice, led him to overlook the 
hermeneutic and sociological significance of deconstruction. Indeed, in 
Force of Law, Derrida stated that " [ d]econstruction is justice." iss While 
I would not absolutely equate deconstruction and justice, I do insist that 
they are inseparable - or that they should be so. In particular, the 
deconstructive focus on the Other ought to be a central aspect of justice. 
The insatiable drive to reveal violence and deception, to uncover denial, 
exclusion, and oppression, should remain at the forefront of justice. In­
stead of contemplating and pursuing an affirmative vision of justice, we 
should focus on what might be called deconjustice - an endless effort 
to eradicate injustice.156 Consequently, I would modify Balkin's concep­
tion of the virtuous person. In Balkin's eyes: 
To be just we must construct examples of justice using the indetenninate 
urge for justice as our goad rather than as our guide. This means that the 
virtuous person is not a good copyist but a good architect. She attempts 
to satisfy her sense of justice by constructing just institutions.157 
154. NORRIS. supra note 5, at 200 (emphasis omitted). 
155. Derrida, Law, supra note 3, at 945 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Derrida 
writes: "[D]econstructions have always represented, as I see it, the at least necessary 
condition for identifying and combating the totalitarian risk." Derrida, Sound of the Sea, 
supra note 119, at 647. 
156. Cf. WHITE, supra note 116, at 122-23 (recommending reversal of the justice­
injustice priority so that we focus on injustice); Allan C. Hutchinson, Doing the Right 
Thing? Toward a Postmodern Politics, 26 LAW & SoCY. REv. 773 (1992) (noting that 
postmodemism is an effective theoretical resource for radical transformative politics); 
Thurschwell, supra note 150, at 330-32 (claiming that deconstruction is a call to abso­
lute justice, to uncover the violence of law). Drucilla Cornell states: 
[T]he entire project of the philosophy of the limit [or deconstruction] is driven by 
an ethical desire to enact the ethical relation. Again, by the ethical relation I 
mean to indicate the aspiration to a nonviolent relationship to the Other, and to 
otherness more generally, that assumes responsibility to guard the Other against 
the appropriation that would deny her difference and singularity. 
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHlLoSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 62 (1992). 
157. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1141 (emphasis added). 
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To me, the virtuous person focuses less on the construction of just insti­
tutions than on the deconstruction of unjust ones. The virtuous person, 
in other words, primarily pursues deconjustice, for the diminution of in­
justice will produce increasingly just institutions. 158 
Ultimately, however, the intimate connection of deconstruction and 
justice ends in paradox, not in a determinate relation.159 Deconstruction 
underscores that the Other always lies in the margin - some individu­
als and groups always are excluded and denied. Thus, deconstruction 
challenges us to justify this violence and oppression or to change. Yet 
even if we change, we do not eradicate the Other; some outgroup al­
ways exists. But not all outgroups or Others are the same. We should 
not necessarily surrender to some social group merely because it has 
been oppressed as the Other. Some groups should be oppressed, while 
others should not be.160 Neo-Nazis, for example, should be oppressed, 
but Democrats should not. And in some instances, being open to and in­
clusive of some former outgroup risks the suppression of oneself. Even 
more perplexing, when we seek to open to an outgroup, we risk impos­
ing a different form of subjugation. Instead of ignoring or silencing the 
outgroup, we might colonize it by appropriating and altering its mes­
sage and by urging its members to assimilate into the dominant 
group.161 At any rate, these paradoxes mean only that deconstruction 
does not produce determinate results. But one should not have expected 
otherwise. Postmodern interpretivism neither promises nor provides 
foundations, yet it nonetheless remains markedly political. 
158. Before anyone started talking about deconstruction, Edmond N. Cahn wrote 
that justice "means the active process of remedying or preventing what would arouse 
the sense of injustice." EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13-14 (1949) 
(emphasis omitted). Cahn, however, considers this sense of injustice to be a natural ca­
pacity or predisposition of the human animal. See id. at 24-25. In this regard, then, 
Cahn's argument resembles Balkin's emphasis on the wellsprings of the human soul. 
159. Cf. Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 5, at 1082-83 (noting that 
postmodemism revels in paradoxes). 
160. I agree with Balkin on this point. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 1 162-64; ac­
cord WIDTE, supra note 1 16, at 125-42. As Balkin observes: "Justice, it seems, does 
not always demand that one speak in the language of the Other, especially when the 
Other is not playing by the same rules." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1164. 
161. In the words of Stephen K. White: 
The delight with the appearance of the other brings with it the urge to draw it 
closer. But that urge must realize its limits, beyond which the drawing nearer be­
comes a gesture of grasping. And that realization will be palpable only when we 
are sensitive to the appearance of the particular other as testimony of finitude. 
Then delight will be paired with a sense of grief or mourning at the fragility and 
momentary quality of the appearance of the other. 
WIDTE, supra note 116, at 90. 
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CONCLUSION 
Dennis Patterson worries about an infinite regress of interpreta­
tions. J.M. Balkin worries about our inexhaustible urge to justice. 
Neither need worry. Postmodern interpretivism is a social reality. We do 
not get the opportunity to accept or reject it: postmodern interpretivism 
is our being-in-the-world. Philosophical hermeneutics explains how we 
come to understand a text without falling into an infinite regress, and 
hermeneutics and deconstruction explain how we constantly pursue jus­
tice even as it always eludes our grasp. 
Yet, theorizing can matter. The articulation and advocacy of a the­
ory of postmodern interpretivism might have some political valence. In 
particular, theories of philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction 
can help us to stop worrying about relativism, solipsism, and nihilism; 
interpretivist theories can turn our attention away from these modernist 
hobgoblins and toward social issues instead. Thus, to Patterson, partly 
because he rejects postmodern interpretivism, the task of jurisprudence 
is still largely descriptive and analytical - and therefore conservative. 
But to me, the task of jurisprudence is first and foremost critical - to 
uncover the denial and exclusion of the Other within the law. 
At the same time, I do not wish to overstate the political signifi­
cance of this article. While I fmd it personally rewarding to make a po­
litical statement (as I do here), I am not deluded enough to believe that 
I am changing the world in some significant and immediate fashion. 
Nobody is going to run out tomorrow to restructure economic relations 
in American society because I have argued that understanding is inter­
pretation. More specifically, I do not believe that this article even can 
influence Patterson. He appears so strongly committed to his profes­
sional identity as a certain type of Wittgensteinian pragmatist that he is 
unlikely to consider seriously any alternative positions. Balkin, how­
ever, might be another story. I hope that his case of postmodern vertigo 
was only temporary. For several years, Balkin has been one of the few 
legal writers willing to explore postmodern issues such as the social 
construction of reality, the role of ideology, and the problem of social 
critique.162 Losing him to some updated form of modernism would be a 
shame. Perhaps he will soon return to his postmodern self. The self, 
though, is such a modernist concept, but then again, vestiges of mod­
ernism always seem to be lying in the margins of postmodernism -
like a soul in deconstruction? 
162. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE 
LJ. 743 (1987); J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 1966 (1992); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1991) 
(book review). 
